University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 2012 | Issue 1

Article 14

Applying Leon: Does the Good Faith Exception
Apply to Title III Interceptions
Melanie B. Harmon
Melanie.Harmon@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
Recommended Citation
Harmon, Melanie B. () "Applying Leon: Does the Good Faith Exception Apply to Title III Interceptions," University of Chicago Legal
Forum: Vol. 2012: Iss. 1, Article 14.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2012/iss1/14

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal
Forum by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Applying Leon: Does the Good Faith
Exception Apply to Title III Interceptions?
Melanie B. Harmont

INTRODUCTION
Wiretapping and other methods of electronic surveillance
can be used to combat public corruption. In the trial of former
Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich, for example, some of the most
shocking evidence came from wiretaps on Blagojevich's personal
phone.' Wiretap evidence has also been used in anticorruption
investigations and prosecutions of such defendants as William
Cellini, Antoin Rezko, members of the New York City Police Department, and Richard Lipsky. 2 But just as when wiretapping is
used to combat lower-profile crimes, minor and unintentional
legal defects can occur in the wiretapping process, which involves
obtaining a wiretapping warrant. Must such errors render wiretap and derivative evidence useless to prosecutors?
American constitutional jurisprudence, relying on the
Fourth Amendment, typically requires that ill-gotten evidence be
excluded from use at trial.3 As a practical matter, however, as

t BA 2010, Northwestern University; JD Candidate 2013, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 See Douglas Belkin and Stephanie Banchero, Blagojevich Convicted on Corruption
Charges, Wall Street J A3 (June 28, 2011). See also Criminal Complaint, United States v
Rod Blagojevich, No 08-CR-888, *59 (ND Ill filed Dec 7, 2008) (quoting a wiretap recording in which Blagojevich states, "I've got this thing and it's fucking golden, and, uh, uh,
I'm not just giving it up for fuckin' nothing").
2 See Annie Sweeney, First Wiretaps Played in Trial of Longtime Springfield Power
Broker (Chicago Tribune Oct 13, 2011), online at http://articles.chicagotribune.com /201110-13/news/chi-cellinis-voice-heard-on-tape-at-corruption-trial-20111013_1_springfieldpower-broker-trs-allocation-thomas-rosenberg (visited Sept 10, 2012); Natasha Korecki,
Rezko Trial: Tony on Tape, Eye on Rezko Blog (Chicago Sun Times May, 13, 2008), online
at http://blogs.suntimes.com/rezko/2008/05/rezko trial-tony-on tape.html (visited Sept
10, 2012); Melanie Eversley, NYPD Wiretaps Reveal Ticket-Fixing, Racially Disparaging
Remarks, OnDeadline (USA Today Sept 26, 2011), online at http://content.usatoday.com/
communities/ondeadline/post/2011/09/nypd-wiretaps-reveal-ticket-fixing-racially-dispara
ging-remarks/1#.T4w98ZqXTzx (visited Sept 10, 2012); David Halbfinger, In a Series of
Phone Calls, an Ear into a Federal Corruption Case, NY Times A20 (Mar 12, 2011).
' See Weeks v United States, 232 US 383 (1914).
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more evidence is available at trial, the accurate resolution of a
case becomes more likely.4 And in the realm of high-profile-and
often copycat-public corruption, the public's desire to convict
corrupt individuals might be heightened.5 Thus, the fight against
corruption may be best served by a regime that allows minimally
"tainted" wiretap evidence to enter the trial record because, although these minor wiretapping errors are inadvertent, the adverse effects of evidentiary suppression are potentially quite
large. 6 Whether the admission of such evidence is legally permissible, however, is currently a point of contention among the federal courts.
Perhaps ironically, the federal legislation that addresses investigative wiretapping-Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 7-is actually the source of the confusion as to the appropriate treatment of flawed wiretaps. Several of the federal circuits currently disagree as to whether the existence of a statutory suppression remedy in Title III vitiates certain elements of the constitutional suppression regime.8 In light
of Title III's suppression rule, codified at 18 USC § 2515,9 can the
4 See, for example, Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard McAdams,
Do Exclusionary Rules Convict the Innocent? *3-4 (Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory
Research Paper No 11-11, Nov 2011), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1914453 (visited
Sept 10, 2012).
5 See, for anecdotal beliefs, Belkin and Banchero, Blagojevich Convicted, Wall Street
J at A3 (cited in note 1) (quoting US Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald). See also Patrick Fitzgerald, Keynote Speech, 2012 U Chi Legal F 1, 11-12 (2012); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargainingoutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv L Rev 2463, 2472 (2004).
6 Wiretap evidence has been viewed as some of the strongest evidence in recent
corruption-and other-trials. See, for example, Mark Brown, It's All in the Wiretaps
(Chicago Sun Times Oct 25, 2011), online at http: //www.suntimes.com/newsfbrown/84183
81-452/its-al-in-the-wiretaps.html (visited Sept 10, 2012); Steven Andersen, Listening In:
Raj Rajaratnam Verdict Vindicates White-Collar Wiretaps, InsideCounsel 30-31 (July
2011).
7 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 §§ 801-803 ("Title III"), Pub L
No 90-351, 82 Stat 197, 211-25, codified at 18 USC §2510 et seq.
8 The Fourth Amendment, under penalty of the exclusionary rule, protects citizens
from unreasonable searches carried out by government officials:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
US Const Amend IV. See also Weeks, 232 US 383. Over the years, courts have developed
some limited exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the good faith exception. See
United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 910-13 (1984).
9 "Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in
evidence at any trial ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
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good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule 1 o be applied to wiretaps carried out under a Title III wiretap
order? Some federal courts have answered this question in the
affirmative, while others have found that the judicial good faith
exception cannot be applied."
After reviewing the history of constitutional and statutory
wiretap law in Section I, this Comment will describe the current
ambiguity regarding suppression of wiretap evidence derived
under certain invalid warrants in Section II. Finally, in Section
III, this Comment will attempt to resolve the ambiguity identified in Section II by making three arguments. First, as set out in
Section IIIA, the reasons currently set forth for rejecting the good
faith exception are ill-conceived. Second, as discussed in Section
IIIB, the good faith exception can be directly applied to Title III
wiretaps under the language and history of the statute itself.
Lastly, Section IIIC will argue that even if the good faith exception does not apply directly to Title III wiretaps, courts can apply
the good faith exception indirectly by importing the principles of
good faith into the exercise of judicial discretion or by relying on
the constitutional principle of separation of powers.

I. SETTING THE STAGE
To reach a fuller understanding of the interplay between the
Fourth Amendment suppression regime and Title III, this Section will outline the relevant statutory and decisional laws relating to wiretapping. After reviewing the Supreme Court's early
wiretapping decisions, this Section will discuss Title III. This
Section will conclude by briefly describing the relevant Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence-specifically, the exclusionary rule
and the good faith exception.
A.

The Constitutionality of Wiretaps

Until the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court consistently held
that the Constitution did not prohibit electronic surveillance
chapter." 18 USC §2515.
'o See Leon, 468 US 897.
11 For the major decisions on either side of the divide, see and compare United States
v Moore, 41 F3d 370 (8th Cir 1994) (applying the good faith exception to a Title III wiretap), with United States v Rice, 478 F3d 704 (6th Cir 2007) (refusing to apply the good
faith exception). The circuit split has filtered down to the district court level. See, for
example, United States v Solomonyan, 451 F Supp 2d 626, 637-38 (SDNY 2006). For a
state court case adopting the Rice approach, see People v Jackson, 129 Cal App 4th 129,
156-57 (2005).
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conducted without physical entry onto private property.12 Without an accompanying trespass, the government did not engage in
the type of "unlawful physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area" that was believed to be the hallmark of a Fourth
Amendment violation.13 Starting in the early 1960s, however, the
Court changed course and began to indicate that private conversations might fall within the Fourth Amendment's protection.
First, in Silverman v United States,14 in which surveillance
was conducted by means of a microphone inserted into the defendant's home and abutting a heating duct, the Court based its
decision to suppress not on the "technicality of a trespass upon a
party wall" but rather "upon the reality of an actual intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area."15 Next, in Wong Sun v
United States,16 the Court opined that "the Fourth Amendment
may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well
17
as against the more traditional seizure of 'papers and effects."'
In Berger v New York, 18 the Court's shifting approach to
wiretap evidence moved one step further. Berger considered a
New York statute that permitted the issuance of ex parte eavesdropping orders.1 9 While determining that the statute authorized
searches failing to meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity
and probable cause requirements, the Court held that "conversa20
tions" fell within the ambit of Fourth Amendment protection.
Thus, the use of devices to detect and overhear private conversa12 See Berger v New York, 388 US 41, 50-53 (1967) (reviewing the Court's wiretap
decisions up to 1963).
13 Id at 52, quoting Lopez v United States, 373 US 427, 438-39 (1963). See also
Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438 (1928) (holding that the Constitution did not prohibit wiretapping conducted without actual physical entry onto private premises); Goldman v United States, 316 US 129 (1942) (holding the same for "bugging"); On Lee v United States, 343 US 747 (1952) (finding no liability because "no trespass was committed").
14 365 US 505 (1961).
15 Id at 509, 512. In rejecting the reasoning of the circuit court-which held that the
evidence was admissible because of the lack of a physical trespass-the Court refused to
reexamine the Goldman and On Lee decisions, but also declined to move beyond them by
expanding the viability of the physical trespass requirement. Id at 512.
16 371 US 471 (1963).
17 Id at 485 (emphasis added). In the wake of the Olmstead decision, Congress passed
the Communications Act of 1934. Pub L No 73-416, 48 Stat 1064, codified at 47 USC §151
et seq. Section 605 of the 1934 Communications Act outlawed the unauthorized interception and disclosure of the contents of telephone-based communications. 48 Stat at 1103. A
line of cases interpreting that statute existed separately from the Constitutional decisions
represented by Olmstead and its progeny.
18 388 US 41 (1967).
19 Id at 43-44.
20 Id at 54-58.
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tions constituted a search within the Fourth Amendment's meaning of that term. 21
The Court finally acknowledged that "the premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and
seize ha[d] been discredited" in Katz v United States.22 By instead interpreting the Fourth Amendment to prohibit the recordation of private oral statements, conducted with or without
physical trespass, the Katz court produced a paradigm shift in
wiretap law. 2 3 The search at issue in Katz was, according to the
Court, both reasonable in scope and supported by probable cause.
But as a matter of law, the search violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not approved ex ante by a judicial officer.24
Without "the procedure of antecedent justification" by a neutral
and deliberate judicial officer, the search was a per se violation of
the Fourth Amendment. 25 Indeed, judicial interposition (typically
in the form of a warrant) was a nearly universal "constitutional
precondition of ... electronic surveillance" because none of the

usual exceptions to that Fourth Amendment requirementspecifically, the hot pursuit, incident to arrest, and pursuant to
subject's consent exceptions-were applicable to electronic
searches. 26
B.

Title III, the Federal Wiretap Statute

Following the Berger and Katz decisions, Congress passed
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.27 This legislation was designed to "define on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized, [and to]
prohibit any unauthorized interception." 28 Concerned with privacy as well as crime fighting, Congress drafted Title III so as "to
conform with" and "meet" the constitutional standards announced in Berger and Katz, going so far as to use those cases as
a "guide" in drafting the text of the statute. 29 Title III was also
21 Id at 51, 55, 58.
22 389 US 347, 353 (1967), quoting Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294, 304 (1967).
23 Katz, 389 US at 352-53.
24 Id at 354-57.
25 Id at 359.
26 Id at 357-58.
27 Title III, 82 Stat at 211.
28 Title III, 82 Stat at 211.
29 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, S Rep No 90-1097, 90th
Cong, 2d Sess 1-2, 37, 47 (1968), reprinted in 1968 USCCAN 2112. See also id at 40
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drafted to pull back from the protection afforded by § 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934,30 an earlier wiretap statute that
Congress viewed as overly restrictive of the use of wiretap evidence in criminal prosecutions. 31 Title III thus aimed to serve
seemingly antagonistic goals-the protection of privacy and the
enhancement of law enforcement's investigative power.
To navigate these conflicting objectives, Congress implemented a general prohibition on the interception and disclosure
of the contents of wire, oral, or electronic communications. This
prohibition is codified at 18 USC § 2511. To narrow the scope of
this ban, Congress also created a system whereby law enforcement officers can obtain judicial approval for investigative wiretaps and thereby avoid the statute's prohibitions on interception
and disclosure. 32
To obtain judicial approval for a Title III wiretap, a highranking Department of Justice (DOJ) official (or an analogous
state official) must first authorize an application for a wiretap
order. 33 Next, the application is submitted to a judge of competent jurisdiction, in writing and under oath. 34 If, based on the
information and allegations contained in the application, the reviewing judge finds probable cause and necessity, then the judge
can issue an ex parte order authorizing a wiretap or other electronic interception. 35 A wiretap order issued pursuant to the
above procedure must identify the intercept target, the location
where the wiretap is authorized to occur, the type of communications sought, the particular offense suspected, the length of the
authorization period, the agency that will conduct the interception, and the DOJ official who provided internal authorization for
the application. 36 Many elements of the Title III authorization
system were designed to conform to requirements of the Fourth

("[T]he Berger decision ... has laid out guidelines for the Congress and State legislatures
to follow in enacting wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping statutes which would
meet constitutional requirements."). Other than the stated desire for uniformity, id at 38,
Congress did not clarify why a codification of these constitutional standards was necessary.
30 Pub L No 73-416, 48 Stat 1064, 1103, codified at 47 USC § 605. See note 17.
31 See S Rep No 90-1097 at 39-40 (cited in note 29).
32 18 USC §§ 2516-18.
318 USC §2516.

34 18 USC §2518(1).
3 18 USC §2518(3).
36 18 USC §2518(4).
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Amendment, including ex ante judicial interposition and the necessity and probable cause requirements. 37
To encourage compliance with Title III's limits on wiretapping and electronic surveillance, Congress created a series of
remedies for unlawful interceptions. The general prohibition on
wiretapping and disclosure entails criminal sanctions and allows
for civil suits against wrongful interceptors.3 8 Additionally, 18
USC § 2515 prohibits the use of unlawfully intercepted wire or
oral communications at trial, when disclosure of such information would violate the Title III disclosure ban represented by
the criminal provisions in § 2511.39 To give effect to the § 2515
suppression rule, 18 USC § 2518(10)(a) permits a person whose
communications have been intercepted to move to suppress such
interceptions and any derivative evidence. Three grounds for a
§ 2518(10)(a) suppression motion are listed in the statute: that
the interception was unlawful, that the order was facially insufficient, or that the interception did not conform to the order. 40 If
the court grants a § 2518(10)(a) suppression motion, the challenged interception is deemed to have been conducted in violation of Title III and the § 2515 suppression rule is activated.4 '
Although § 2518(10)(a) lists three grounds under which the
§ 2515 suppression rule may be triggered, the Supreme Court
has held that § 2515 does not mandate suppression for every vio3 See S Rep No 90-1097 at 46-47, 72-74 (cited in note 29).
8 18 USC §2511. Title III's criminal and civil sanctions require intentionality on the
part of the interceptor. See 18 USC §2511(1) ("[A]ny person who-(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; ... shall be punished as provided in
subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).").
3 See note 9 for the text of §2515.
40 18USC §2518(10)(a).
41 The text of §2518(10)(a) reads as follows:
Any aggrieved person [as defined in §2510(11)] in any trial ... may move to
suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant
to this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that-(i) the
communication was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or
approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.... If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire or oral
communication, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been
obtained in violation of this chapter.
18 USC §2518(10)(a). See S Rep No 90-1097 at 78 (cited in note 29) (stating that "Paragraph (10)(a) ... must be read in connection with section[] 2515. It provides the remedy
for the right created by section 2515."). By deeming an interception "in violation of" Title
III, §2518(10)(a) removes the interception from the scope of §2517, which permits disclosure of authorized interceptions by law enforcement. Thus, § 2517 is the link between the
remedy in §2518(10)(a) and the "right"in §§ 2515 and 2511.
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lation of the Title III wiretapping scheme. In United States v

Giordano42 and United States v Chavez,43 the Court determined

that compliance with all of the elements of the statutory system
that were intended specifically to prevent abuse of wiretapping
was enough to defeat a § 2518(10)(a) suppression motion, even if
other requirements of Title III were contravened. 44 For example,
in Chavez, the Court found that the defect in the authorization
order-an incorrect identification of the DOJ official who internally authorized the application-was not constitutional in nature and did not warrant suppression under Congress's statutory
scheme. 45 Indeed, the Court "[could] not say that misidentification was in any sense the omission of a requirement that must be
satisfied if wiretapping or electronic surveillance is to be lawful
under Title III."46 Rather, the Court found that even given the
statute's suppression rule, "suppression [wa]s not mandated for
every violation of Title III."47
A 1986 amendment to the statute extended Title III's protection against unlawful interception to "electronic communications." 48 Finding that the initial statute's references to "wire or
oral communications" did not encompass electronic mail or other
inter-computer communications, Congress believed that this gap
created legal uncertainty that "endanger[ed] the admissibility of
evidence." 49 Generally, then, the 1986 amendment led to uniform
treatment of wire, oral, and electronic communications. Notably,
however, the § 2515 suppression rule was not extended to electronic communications,5 0 and Congress also appended the following language to § 2518(10): "The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter with respect to the interception of electronic communications are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter involving

42 416 US 505 (1974).
'

416 US 562 (1974).

14 Giordano, 416 US at 527; Chavez, 416 US at 574-75.
45 Chavez, 416 US at 569-71.
46 Id at 573.
47 Id at 575.

4 The statute had previously protected only "wire and oral communications." See
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 §§ 101-111 (ECPA), Pub L No 99-508,
100 Stat 1848, 1848-59, codified in various sections of Title 18.
49 See Electronic CommunicationsPrivacy Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-541, 99th Cong,
2d Sess 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 3555.
50 See 18 USC §2515 (covering only "wire or oral communications"); S Rep No 99-541
at 22 (cited in note 49).
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such communications." 1 Thus, the target of an electronic communication intercept that violates Title III but not the Constitution has no suppression remedy available.
C.

The Good Faith Exception

The exclusionary rule-formulated by the Supreme Court in
the absence of a constitutional penalty for violations of the
Fourth Amendment-prohibits the use, as substantive evidence
of guilt, of any material obtained during a search conducted in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.5 2 The exclusionary rule also
bars derivative evidence flowing from an unconstitutional search
under the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 53 Much like the
suppression rule in Title III-through the defined term "aggrieved person" in § 2518(10)(a)-only parties who were constitutionally wronged by the search and against whom the evidence is
being levied have standing to invoke the rule. 5 4
The good faith exception, first announced in United States v
Leon,55 is one of several principles developed by the Supreme
Court that limit the scope of the exclusionary rule.5 6 According to
the good faith exception, the exclusionary rule is not triggered
when a law enforcement officer acted in objectively reasonable,
good faith reliance on a search warrant later found to be invalid.57 However, the good faith exception does not apply to warrants that were invalid because the issuing judge was misled by
a knowingly false affidavit.5 8 Similarly, the exception is not activated when the warrant-issuing judge "wholly abandoned his
judicial role"; when the warrant was issued in response to an
affidavit that was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" that it
was unreasonable for the officer to believe probable cause exist-

51 18 USC §2518(10)(c). See also S Rep No 99-541 at 23 (cited in note 49) (noting
that, for violations of a "constitutional magnitude, the court involved in a subsequent trial
will apply existing constitutional law with respect to the exclusionary rule").
52 See Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 391-92 (1914); Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643
(1961).
53 See Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States, 251 US 385 (1920); Nardone v United
States, 308 US 338, 41 (1939).
54 United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 910 (1984).
15 468 US 897 (1984).
56 For a description of other exceptions to the exclusionary rule, see id at 909-13.
57 Id at 920-21.
58 Id at 923. Nor is an affidavit that is false and made with reckless disregard for the
truth subject to the good faith exception. See id.
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ed; or when the warrant was so facially deficient that the officer
could not have reasonably believed it to be valid.5 9
In formulating the good faith exception, the Supreme Court
first considered that the exclusionary rule was a judicial remedy
meant to address the Constitution's lack of a remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations. The exclusionary rule was not a "necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment," because the Fourth
Amendment had never been interpreted as excluding all illegally
seized evidence.6 0 Indeed, use of evidence discovered in or derived from an unconstitutional search "work[s] no new Fourth
Amendment wrong." 6 1 Instead, the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to prevent the initial, constitutional wrong-the unlawful
search itself. As the Court confirmed in Leon, the exclusionary
rule functions to deter law enforcement officers from engaging in
unlawful searches by denying them the expected benefits of those
searches-that is, evidence with which to convict the defendant. 62
By thus separating the constitutional right to be free from
unlawful searches from the judicial remedy of suppression of illgotten evidence, the Court cleared a path for the good faith exception. 63 The exclusionary rule entails both social benefits (deterrence of constitutionally prohibited searches) and costs (failed
prosecutions of actually-guilty defendants); thus, the Court used
a balancing test to evaluate the usefulness of the exclusionary
rule. 6 4 The outcome of this balancing was simply stated by the
Court: When "the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable
deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted." 65 From that
line of reasoning, the good faith exception came clearly into focus. When an officer has acted in good faith, exclusion of evidence is not supported by this balancing test. Because law enforcement officials already display maximum compliance with
the Fourth Amendment in good faith situations, the exclusionary
rule can work no additional deterrence on those parties directly
59 Leon, 468 US at 923.
60 Id at 905-06.
61 Id at 906, quoting United States v Calandra,414 US 338, 354 (1974).
62 Leon, 468 US at 906.
63 Id at 906 ("Language in opinions of this Court and of individual justices has sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment.... [Tihe Fourth Amendment has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.") (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
64 Id at 908.
65 Id at 909.
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responsible for the constitutionality of the search, and the costs
of exclusion are not supported by countervailing benefits. 66
II. A SPLIT ARISES
Federal courts have disagreed as to whether the Leon good
faith exception applies to Title III evidence. This Section will describe the major cases on each side of this split.
A.

Applying Leon

The earliest appellate-level case to address the question held
that Leon's good faith exception applied to Title III wiretaps. In
United States v Malekzadeh,67 the defendant-appellants were
charged and convicted of various narcotics offenses, with evidence obtained from Title III wiretaps playing a role in the convictions.6 8 One defendant moved to suppress the wiretap evidence, asserting that the wiretap order was obtained using information derived from an unconstitutional physical search of his
home carried out several years earlier.6 9 The district court denied
this "fruits of the poisonous tree" claim and the defendant appealed. 70
On appeal, the Malekzadeh court did not apply the "fruits of
the poisonous tree" doctrine to the prior unconstitutional search.
Instead, it approached the suppression question from the perspective of the Title III wiretap order.7 First, the court found
that the wiretap application was actually based on public records
of the conviction that resulted from the prior search-not on evidence derived from the prior search-and that the officer applying for the wiretap order had used that public information in
good faith.7 2 Next, since "the [wiretap] application was devoid of
deliberately false or reckless information that would provide a
sufficient basis to apply the [exclusionary] rule," the court reasoned that "excluding the fruits of the wiretap would in no way
work to deter the conduct of the officer who relied on public in66 Leon, 468 US at 919-20. And because the rule is not designed to deter or punish
errors by judges, the existence of judicial error in a good faith situation does not compel
application of the rule. See id at 916-17.
67 855 F2d 1492 (11th Cir 1988).
68 Id at 1494.

69 Id at 1495-96.
70 Id at 1496.
71 Malekzadeh, 855 F2d at 1497.
72 Id.
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formation as a basis for the wiretap application."73 As in Leon,
excluding the evidence-in this case procured by a Title III wiretap-served no beneficial purpose. By relying on the Leon decision and its rationale in considering a challenge to Title III evidence, Malekzadeh implicitly held that the good faith exception
was applicable to Title III.74
The second major case to apply the good faith exception to a
Title III wiretap was United States v Moore.7 5 In that case, the
government appealed the district court's grant of the defendant's
§ 2518(10)(a) motion to suppress the wiretap evidence. 76 The
wiretap application and order in Moore met the constitutional
requirements of probable cause and the other conditions of Title
III, but the issuing judge had failed to sign the order.7 7 Agreeing
with the district court that the order was "insufficient on its face"
as that phrase is used in § 2518(10)(a)(ii), the Eighth Circuit
nonetheless refused to suppress the wiretap evidence.78 According to the court, the missing judicial signature represented only a
"technical defect" in the wiretap order, which, under the
Giordano and Chavez rules, 7 9 did not require suppression.8 0
In Moore, the government also argued that suppression of
the wiretap evidence should be denied under the Leon exception. 81 In response, the court recognized that the exclusionary
rule and the good faith exception were judicial creations, while
the issue on appeal was the statutory exclusionary rule. 8 2 However, because it perceived in the legislative history of Title III an
intent to adopt future Fourth Amendment suppression principles, the Moore court found that Leon's good faith exception was
applicable to the § 2518(10)(a) motion to suppress. 83 The court
13 Id at 1497.

74 There is no reference in the Malekzadeh opinion to the §2515 suppression rule.
Although it is not entirely obvious that the Eleventh Circuit was not actually applying
the good faith exception to the prior physical search, other courts have uniformly read the
Malekzadeh case as applying Leon to the wiretap. See, for example, United States v Heilman, 377 Fed Appx 157, n 21 (3d Cir 2010).
7 41 F3d 370 (8th Cir 1994).
76 Id at 371-72.
1 Id at 372-74.
78 Id at 375-76.
7 See notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
80 Moore, 41 F3d at 374-75.
81 Id at 376.
82 Id.
83 Id, citing S Rep No 90-1097 (cited in note 29). An opinion concurring in the judgment but rejecting the application of the good faith exception was released by Judge
Bright. See Moore, 41 F3d at 377.
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found additional support for application of the good faith exception in § 2518(10)(a) itself, by reading the language there-"If the
motion is granted .. ."-as providing for judicial discretion in adjudicating Title III suppression motions. 84
Finally, the Third Circuit has suggested another approach
by which to apply the good faith exception to Title III wiretap
evidence. In United States v Heilman,85 the Third Circuit refused
to decide the question of the applicability of Leon to Title III because the district court order upon which the Heilman appeal
was taken was not made on that basis.8 6 However, in a footnote
recognizing the disagreement between circuits as to the relationship between Title III and Leon, the court noted that:
This modification to the exclusionary rule applies to [the]
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Because the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy, it is within the judiciary'sprovince to determine when it applies.8 7
Under the approach suggested by Heilman, the good faith
exception can be applied to Title III, not because Congress has
approved it or called for it, but because the judiciary does. The
Fourth Circuit, relying on the authority of Moore and Malekzadeh, has also applied the Leon good faith exception to at least one
Title III wiretap.8 8

84 Moore, 41 F3d at 376. The Eighth Circuit has since backpedaled to some extent on
its pro-Leon position. In United States v Lomeli, 676 F3d 734 (8th Cir 2012), the court
held that the good faith exception cannot be applied to a wiretap order, the invalidity of
which is due to the applicant's "fail[ure] to comply with the edicts of the federal wiretap
statute in procuring the order." Id at 742-43. Although the court expressed this pronouncement in sweeping language, the court justified it by performing the Leon balancing
test. Id ("To hold otherwise on these facts would prompt bad practices and reward those
who routinely include mere boilerplate language in wiretap applications."). Thus, it is not
clear whether the Lomeli holding is a broad rebuttal of Leon or simply an application of
Leon to the facts. Alternatively, the Lomeli opinion may represent a redefining of "good
faith" based on the Title III requirements. See id ("Without including the name of the
authorizing DOJ official on wiretap applications, there can be no 'good faith' reliance
under the statutory scheme.").
8 377 Fed Appx 157 (2010) (unreported). Because the Heilman decision was not
selected for publication, its precedential value may be limited.
86 Id at 184-85 & n 21.
87 Id at n 21 (emphasis added).
88 See United States v Brewer, 204 Fed Appx 205, 208 (4th Cir 2006) (unreported).
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Rejecting Leon

The earliest case to deny the applicability of Leon's good
faith exception to Title III wiretaps was United States v Orozco.89
The district judge hearing Orozco was confronted with a series of
motions to suppress made by several different defendants and
relating to a set of eleven interception orders issued over the
course of a year. 90 In response, the government claimed that "the
principles of Leon" should guide the court's decision because the
officers acted with good faith in applying for the wiretap orders.9 1
The court found that Congress did not intend to incorporate later-arising Fourth Amendment principles into Title III and thus
rejected the government's Leon-based response to the motions to
suppress. 92 Moreover, the court stated that the judicial origin of
the exclusionary rule meant that its corollaries were inapposite
to statutory motions to suppress. 93 In support of this proposition,
the Orozco court cited Supreme Court precedent: "The suppression remedy for [ ] statutory, as opposed to constitutional, violations [ ] turns on the provisions of Title III rather than the ...
exclusionary rule."9 4 Therefore, Orozco refused to "view the exclusionary rule and 18 USC § 2515 as providing interchangeable
remedial sources," and thus did not apply the good faith exception to the motion to suppress.95
The principal case rejecting the Leon exception in the context of Title III is United States v Rice.9 6 In Rice, the defendant's
motion to suppress was based on the misleading nature of the
application for the wiretap order. Specifically, the affidavit accompanying the application implied that other investigative
methods had been attempted, when in fact they had not.9 7 Finding this misrepresentation to be reckless, the district court ruled
that the good faith exception, even if applicable, was not triggered and thus granted the motion to suppress.9 8 On appeal, the

89 630 F Supp 1418 (SD Cal 1986).
90 Id at 1430.
91 Id at 1521.

92 Id at 1522 & n 9.
9 Orozco, 630 F Supp at 1522.
9 Id at 1522, quoting United States v Donovan, 429 US 413, 433 n 22 (1977).
9 Orozco, 630 F Supp at 1522.
96 478 F3d 704 (6th Cir 2007).
97 Id at 707-08.
98 Id at 708-09.
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Sixth Circuit rejected the government's claim that the Leon exception applied to Title III wiretaps. 99
The Rice court found that the judicial rule of Leon should not
apply in a statutory situation because the "lengthy discussion on
the social costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule" on which
Leon was founded was inapplicable to Title III wiretaps. Specifically, the existence of a suppression remedy in Title III signified
that "Congress ha[d] already balanced the social costs and benefits" of suppression in the wiretap context.10 0 In reaching this
conclusion, Rice further relied on the language and legislative
history of Title III to reject the good faith exception. 101
First, the court approached § 2515 as an exclusive remedy
that is "clear on its face and does not provide for any exception."102 To the Rice court, this indicated that "[c]ourts must suppress illegally obtained wire communications." 10 3 As to the legislative history, the Rice court found that Congress intended Title
III to reject any later-arising constitutional suppression standards. 1 0 4 Specifically, Rice emphasized the word "present" in Congress's statement that Title III was not designed to "press the
scope of the suppression role beyond present search and seizure
law."10 5 Under the court's reading, this language embodied a congressional desire to "incorporate only the search and seizure law
that was in place" when Title III was passed in 1968, sixteen
years before the Leon decision. 106
Finally, in denying the applicability of Leon in the context of
Title III, the Rice court explicitly rejected the Moore and Malekzadeh decisions.10 7 First, Moore's emphasis on the discretionary
element of § 2518(10)(a) was misguided, according to Rice.108
While the decision to grant or deny such a motion must necessarily be made by the court, the statute's closed system of remedies strictly confined the discretionary element of that decision.
The Rice court found that "[w]hen [the statute is] read as a
whole, it is clear that the suppression decision must be made
9 Id at 706.
1oo Rice, 478 F3d at 712, 713.
101 Id at 712-13.
102 Id at 712.

103 Id at
104 Rice,
105 Id at
106 Rice,

712 (emphasis added).
478 F3d at 713.
713, quoting S Rep No 90-1097 (cited in note 29).
478 F3d at 713.

107 Id at 714.
108 Id.
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within the strict confines of Title III itself, and is far from 'discretionary."' 0 9 The Rice panel also asserted that its reading of the
legislative history of Title III-the direct opposite of that advanced in Moore-was correct." 0 Lastly, as for Malekzadehwhich "made no attempt to explain why reasoning from a Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule case was appropriately imported
into a Title III case"-the Rice court was simply unconvinced."'
III. RESOLUTION: LEON CAN PROPERLY BE APPLIED TO TITLE III

This Section will argue that the Leon good faith exception
can be applied to Title III motions to suppress. Section IIIA will
first discuss why the logic of the cases refusing to apply Leon is
subject to criticism. Next, Section IIIB will explain why the good
faith exception can be directly applied to Title III wiretaps. This
Section will conclude by arguing in Section IIIC that even if none
of the reasons supporting direct application of the Leon exception
are persuasive, there is leeway within the scheme of Title III for
courts to employ the rationale and principles of the good faith
exception.112
Criticizing Orozco and Rice

A.

The Orozco decision contains inadequacies and mischaracterizations that bring into question the validity of its holding.
First, the Orozco court failed to address why, even if the suppression decision turned on the language of Title III, that decision could not at least be informed by broader Fourth Amendment principles. The government actually advanced this approach, not the direct application of Leon that the Orozco opinion
rejected.11 3 The government's proposed indirect approach to Leon
109 Id.
110 Rice, 478 F3d at 714 ("If anything, the meaning of the Senate Report is that it
intends Title III to incorporate only what the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence existed
at the time of the Act's passage (which was before Leon) and nothing more.").

1

Id.

112 Thus, this Comment argues that a valid solution to this circuit split already exists

and can simply be applied by the courts. For a commentary that advances a legislative
solution to the Title III-Leon problem, see Derik T. Fettig, When "Good Faith" Makes
Good Sense: Applyinng Leon's Exception to the Exclusionary Rule to the Government's
Reasonable Reliance on Title III Wiretap Evidence, 49 Harv J Leg 373, 384 (2012)
("[R]esolution of this circuit split under the current version of the statute is far from certain, which leads to the proposal . .. that Congress should amend Title III to clarify that
the good faith exception applies in wiretap cases.").
113 See United States v Orozco, 630 F Supp 1418, 1521 (SD Cal 1986) (recognizing that
"[t]he government argues that the procedures followed by agents to obtain intercept or-
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may have been closer to Congress's stated goals for Title III than
complete and unequivocal suppression.114 Indeed, the balancing
of effective law enforcement against the protection of Fourth
Amendment privacy rights-epitomized precisely by the good
faith exception-is clearly in line with the purpose of Title III as
stated by Congress. 115
The Orozco court also misstated the Title III suppression
rule. It is not the case that, as the court claimed, "18 U.S.C.
§2515 expressly states that evidence derived from wire or oral
communications intercepted in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2510 et
seq. may not be used in any proceeding before any court."1 16 In
actuality, § 2515 states that evidence may not be used when disclosure of that evidence would violate the statute and § 2511(1)(c)
makes disclosure of material obtained through an interception
conducted in violation of § 2511(1) a statutory violation. In the
context of a § 2518(10)(a) suppression motion-where the interception is deemed to have been conducted in violation of Title
111-the statute's prohibition on the use of the wrongfully intercepted evidence necessarily flows through the judicial branch.
That is to say, suppression is not provided for "expressly" in
§ 2515, as the Orozco court wrongly posited. Rather, Title III can
be seen as bestowing on court-authorized wiretaps a cloak of admissibility that can be lifted only indirectly, through a court order granting a § 2518(10)(a) motion.11 7 If suppression were express and an automatic legal result, § 2518(10)(a) would be, at
best, an unnecessary restatement of a rule of evidence or criminal procedure, or at worst, mere surplusage. Because Congress
included the language of § 2518(10)(a) in the statute, courts
should adopt an interpretation of Title III that gives meaning to
that passage. Orozco's indifference to the existence of

ders for wiretaps are similarly grounded in a good faith belief as to their validity, and
therefore the principles of Leon should be extended to review of wiretap applications" but
later stating that "the court questions the applicabilityof the Leon good faith exception in
the electronic surveillance context") (emphasis added).
114 For a discussion of Congress's goals in passing Title III, see notes 27-31.
115 See S Rep No 90-1097 at 38 (cited in note 29); 82 Stat at 211-12.
116 Orozco, 630 F Supp at 1522 (emphasis added).
117 The language of § 2518(10)(a) seems to be legally inconsistent: "Any aggrieved
person ... may move to suppress ... communication interceptedpursuant to this chapter ...
on the grounds that the communication was unlawfully intercepted; ... If the motion is
granted, the [interception] ... shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this
chapter." (emphasis added). A presumption that court-authorized wiretaps are valid and
admissible may explain how communications that are intercepted in accordance with
Title III can be challenged as unlawful and regarded as violating the statute.
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§ 2518(10)(a) fails to do this, leaving § 2518(10)(a) without practical effect.
Finally, in a related line of reasoning, the Orozco court asserted that, if Congress had meant to incorporate the Leon rule
into Title III, it would have amended the statutory text.1 18 However, Congress's inaction in the wake of Leon is wholly ambiguous. It could be that Congress wanted the Leon exception to apply to Title III and believed that, under the current statute, it
did. Alternatively, Congress might not have wanted Leon to apply and thought that, under Title III as written, it did not apply. 119
A closer look at Rice reveals that it too suffers from several
weaknesses. First, the portion of the Rice opinion discussing the
relationship between Leon and suppression under Title III is effectively dictum. The district court had determined that even if

the good faith exception applied to Title III, it was inappropriate
in the Rice situation because the officer had not acted with good
faith. 120 Although the Rice court stated that the standard of review was clear errorl 2 1-indicating that it recognized that the
question presented was factual in nature-it also decided an unnecessary question of law: whether Leon applies to Title III motions to suppress. 122
The lower court had not decided that question, opting instead to make a factual finding. Under Leon itself, and as it had
been interpreted in the Sixth Circuit, "the good-faith exception is
inapposite ... where the issuing magistrate was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would
have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the
truth."123 The Rice defendant alleged precisely this, so the government's appeal must have sought first to deny the validity of
that allegation. When the Rice court affirmed that finding, 124 it
needed go no further.
The Rice court's decision to move one step beyond the necessary issue on appeal might have been excusable in the name of
118 Orozco, 630 F Supp at 1522 ("Congress has not in the wake of the Leon decision
attempted to modify this remedy [of § 2515].").
119 See Johnson v TransportationAgency, 480 US 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia dissenting)
("[W]e should admit that vindication by congressional inaction is a canard.").
120 Rice, 478 F3d at 709.
121 Id.
122 Id at 711-14.

123 Id at 712, quoting United States v Hython, 443 F3d 480, 484 (6th Cir 2006).
124 Rice, 478 F3d at 710-11.
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clarity-as the court itself opinedl 25-had it not entailed disregarding valid in-circuit precedent. In United States v Baranek,126
the Sixth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment "plain view"
exception applied to Title III wiretaps.127 Besides the apparent
analogy-that if the judicial plain view exception applies to Title
III suppression, then so should the good faith exception-the
Baranek court also cited approvingly the government's argument
that suppression should not obtain because the officer acted with
good faith. 128 The Baranek court noted that the law enforcement
officers were not charged with wrongdoing and also recognized
that its holding would have no deterrent effect on future misconduct.129
Moreover, Baranek explicitly rejected the "contention that
Fourth Amendment law is not involved in the resolution of Title
III suppression issues" because "[t]he Supreme Court has indicated to the contrary."o3 0 Rather, with "a factual situation clearly
not contemplated by the statute, [the Baranek court found] it
helpful on the suppression issue-as opposed to the question of
whether there was a violation of the authorization order-to look
to Fourth Amendment law."11 In light of this, Rice's attempt to
distinguish Baranek on its facts seems inadequate.132 The
Baranek court did not express a desire to limit its reasoning to
the facts, only its holding. Given that, Rice would have been well
served to address the relevant portions of Baranek, or even directly overrule it.

B.

Directly Applying the Good Faith Exception to Title III

There are at least three reasons why the Leon good faith exception can apply directly to Title III wiretaps. First, the linkage
between a § 2518(10)(a) motion to suppress and the mens rea
125 Id at 711 ("[W~e have not previously made clear whether the good-faith exception
applies to warrants improperly issued under Title III.").
126 903 F2d 1068 (6th Cir 1990).
127 Id at 1070.
128 Id.
129 Id at 1072.
130 Baranek, 903 F2d at 1072, quoting Scott v United States, 436 US 128, 139 (1978).

131 Baranek, 903 F2d at 1072.
132 Rice also appears to misconstrue the words of the Baranek court. Rice quotes
Baranek in an attempt to explain why Baranek is not binding or even persuasive precedent. Rice, 478 F3d at 713. But in saying that its holding would "not impact or shape
future conduct," the Baranek court likely meant that the future conduct of future law
enforcement officers would be unaffected, not that the opinion was not meant to be precedential, as Rice asserts. Baranek, 903 F2d at 1070.
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requirement of § 2511 allows-even requires-considerations of
good faith when deciding such a motion. Second, Title III does
not explicitly disclaim judicially crafted remedies for interceptions of wire and oral communications, but does do so for interceptions of electronic communications. Wire and oral communications, then, are subject to judicially crafted remedies such as
the good faith exception, even for statutory violations. 133 And for
wiretapping violations of a constitutional magnitude, the Court's
constitutional jurisprudence-including the good faith exception-controls, regardless of whether such wiretaps also violate
Title III, because of separation of powers considerations. Third,
the legislative history of Title III evinces a congressional intent
to incorporate later-arising limitations on suppression.
1. Connection between § 2518(10)(a) and § 2511.
Title III grants courts bounded discretion in deciding
§ 2518(10)(a) motions to suppress. 134 That section does not allow
a suppression motion to be made on the "basis of justice," "when
the principles of equity dictate," or upon another similar basis.
At the same time, the enumeration in § 2518(10)(a) of grounds for
a suppression motion does not mean that the suppression decision cannot account for good faith reliance by law enforcement.
In fact, because the §2518(10)(a) suppression motion is meant to
be decided with reference to § 2515,135 the mens rea requirement
implicit in § 2515 is relevant to the suppression decision.
Specifically, § 2515 prohibits disclosure of intercepted communications at trial when such disclosure would violate some
part of Title III. But only intentional disclosure coupled with
knowledge of the unlawful interception is prohibited by Title
III.136 The connection between a § 2518(10)(a) motion to suppress
and the intentionality requirement in § 2511 indicates that Congress wanted courts to consider something akin to the state of
mind of law enforcement when deciding whether to suppress
challenged Title III evidence. The good faith exception-which
addresses both the subjective and objective behavior of law en133 For the definitions of wire, oral, or electronic

communications, see 18 USC

§ 2510(1), (2), and (12) respectively.
134 See note 41 for the text of 18 USC § 2518(10)(a).
135 See S Rep No 90-1097 at 78 (cited in note 29) (stating that § 2518(10)(a) "must be
read in connection with" § 2515 because it provides the "remedy for the right created by"
that section).
136 See 18 USC § 2511.
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forcement-is a proxy for just that. 137 Thus, by the very structure
and language of Title III, Congress presaged the good faith exception and created an opening for the direct applicability of Leon to Title III.
2. Inference arising from the 1986 amendment to
§ 2518(10)(c) and integrity of separation of powers.
A second textual/structural feature of Title III counsels in
favor of employing the Leon good faith exception in at least a certain subset of Title III motions to suppress. When describing the
procedural mechanics of the Title III suppression regime in
§ 2518(10), Congress explicitly disclaimed extra-statutory remedies for statutorily improper interceptions (so-called "nonconstitutional violations") of electronic communications. 1 38 Because
Congress added this disclaimer-found at § 2518(10)(c)-two
years after the Leon decision, 139 it was at least aware that the
good faith exception had entered the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that it was expressly disclaiming. A similar provision
addressing wire and oral communications, however, is absent
from the statute.
This lack of an analogous provision suggests that Congress
did not intend to exclude judicially crafted remedies when the
challenged interception contained wire or oral communications 14 0
and the purported violation was statutory in nature. Indeed, to
give meaning to every word in the statute, 141 judicially created
remedies like the exclusionary rule and the good faith exception
must be applied to statutorily-improper wiretaps of wire and oral
137 Under the good faith exception, the germane questions are as follows: First, did the
officer actually, subjectively rely on the warrant? And second, was that reliance objectively reasonable? See Leon, 468 US at 919-22.
138 See 18 USC §2518(10)(c) ("The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter
with respect to the interception of electronic communications are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter involving such communications."). The statute's suppression rule does not apply to electronic communications,
leaving only the civil and criminal penalties. See 18 USC §§ 2515 and 2518(10)(a) (applying only to "wire or oral communication"). But see 18 USC §§2511(1)(a), (c)-(e), 2520(a)
(applying to "wire, oral, or electronic communication"). Thus, for interceptions of electronic communications that represent statutory, but not constitutional violations, the good
faith exception cannot be directly applied when deciding the motion to suppress.
139 See ECPA, 100 Stat 1848-59.
140 See, for example, Norman Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction§ 47:23 (West 7th ed 2007).
141 "[A] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that
no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant." Corley v United States,
556 US 303, 314 (2009), quoting Hibbs v Winn, 542 US 88, 101 (2004).
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communications. Otherwise, the language contained in
§ 2518(10)(c) would be surplusage. 142
As for constitutional violations, the Berger and Katz decisions 143 made it clear that the Fourth Amendment applies to
wiretaps, and the existence of Title III cannot alter constitutional
protections. Thus, the exclusionary rule and the good faith exception should apply to wiretaps and other interceptions that violate
constitutional search and seizure rules, even if such interceptions also happen to violate Title III. Moreover, Congress likely
did not mean for Title III to negate the judicially crafted system
of remedies for Fourth Amendment violations. During the passage of the original Title III legislation in 1968, for example,
Congress stated that Title III was intended to mimic the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment wiretap jurisprudence, which
at that time included the exclusionary rule. 144 And during the
process of amending Title III in 1986, Congress again disclosed
an intention to preserve the constitutional suppression regime
for constitutional violations, stating: "In the event that there is a
violation of law of a constitutional magnitude, the court involved
in a subsequent trial will apply the existing constitutional law
with respect to the exclusionary rule." 14 5 For a wiretap that represents any constitutional violation--even if it also entails a
statutory violation-the relevant suppression regime is the one
developed in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, meaning
that direct application of the good faith exception is germane.
Even if Congress intended Title III to prevent the constitutional suppression regime from applying to wiretaps that represent Fourth Amendment violations, 146 the courts should not al142 It might be argued that this interpretation of § 2518(10)(c) makes the subsection
itself surplusage-because there is no statutory suppression remedy for electronic communications, there is no need to disclaim the good faith exception. However, the language
of § 2518(10)(c) disclaims the exclusionary rule, and by implication the Leon exception, as
well as underscores the lack of a statutory remedy. Congress's statement, in the Senate
Report accompanying the relevant legislation, that § 2518(10)(c) meant to underscore the
lack of a statutory suppression rule for electronic communications, does not mean that
§2518(10)(c) does not also disclaim non-statutory (that is, judicially crafted) remedies.
See S Rep No 99-541 at 23 (cited in note 49). Purported congressional intent should not be
used to limit the obvious meaning of a statutory text.
143 See notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
144 See S Rep No 90-1097 at 2, 37, 47 (cited in note 29).
145 See S Rep No 99-541 at 23 (cited in note 49) (explaining the § 2518(10)(c) disclaimer of remedies for electronic communications). Although this statement was addressed to
electronic interceptions, the principle applies with equal vigor to all interceptions.
146 It might be argued that the statutory remedies of Title III preempt the constitutional remedy of the exclusionary rule because courts should defer to that weighing of
social costs and benefits conducted by Congress. See, for example, Rice, 478 F3d at 712-
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low this result. Specifically, the judiciary should not concede to
Congress the power to change constitutional principles simply by
codifying them. 147 It is not the role of Congress in a system of
divided powers to determine the scope and viability of Constitutional rights, remedies, or rules.148 Indeed, it is "the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" because
that "is of the very essence of judicial duty," especially when that
law is the Constitution. 14 9
Although Congress can enact laws that are more protective
of rights than the Constitution, it should not have the power to
impose harsher remedies than the Constitution for basic constitutional violations.15 0 Given the exceedingly close relationship
between Fourth Amendment principles such as probable cause,
judicial interposition, and minimization and the Title III requirements, the Title III suppression rule, if read exclusively,
produces just such an outcome. To the extent that Title III has
the same requirements for a valid wiretap as the Fourth
Amendment-that is, where Title III tracks the Constitution exactly-the full constitutional remedial regime, including the exclusionary rule and the good faith exception, should be applied to
violations of those requirements.
3. Incorporation of later-arising principles.
Finally, much has been said about Congress's statement that
Title III was not meant "to press the scope of the suppression
role beyond present search and seizure law."1 5 ' The courts that
oppose applying Leon to Title III maintain that this congression13.
147 See Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 436 (2000) ("Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.").
148 Compare US Const Art I, §§ 1, 8 with US Const Art III.
149 Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 177-78 (1803). See also Linda Jellum, "Which is to
be Master," the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation
of Powers, 56 UCLA L Rev 837, 862, 875 (2009) (reviewing the formalistic and functionalistic approaches to separation of powers).
150 This notion at first seems nonsensical, as the Fourth Amendment suppression
regime might be interpreted as the baseline set of remedies. But the case law and literature on Congress's "enforcement powers" under the Fourteenth Amendment are instructive. See, for example, City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 532 (1997) (discussing the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as an impermissible utilization of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers and finding that it "appears [ ] to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections"). Outside the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment, where Congress does not even have enforcement powers, the limit on Congress's ability to meddle with constitutional remedies is perhaps even clearer. See also
Dickerson, 530 US 428.
151 S Rep No 90-1097 at 69 (cited in note 29).
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al statement signals a desire for the Title III suppression rules to
remain fixed at the level of constitutional suppression in 1968.152
This interpretation of the legislative history is inaccurate. Rather, this statement suggests that Congress did not wish to expand the scope of suppression beyond that required by the Constitution in 1968. Thus, the incorporation of later-arising constitutional developments that hem in that suppression regime is
not inapposite to Congressional intent. 153 Indeed, Congress's
identification of the § 2515 suppression remedy as an "evidentiary sanction to compel compliance" with Title III portended the
Court's understanding of the exclusionary rule expressed in Leon. 154 Accordingly, Congress's statement as to the intended scope
of the suppression remedy in Title III indicates only that it did
not wish for statutory suppression to exceed 1968 levels, not that
it wanted to eliminate from Title III later-arising constitutional
suppression principles.1 55
C.

Indirectly Applying the Good Faith Exception to Title III

In an alternative approach to directly applying Leon, courts
can indirectly employ the reasoning and principles underlying
the good faith exception when deciding Title III motions to suppress. Because the statute, by its plain language, allows for discretion in granting § 2518(10)(a) motions, 15 6 courts are well within the bounds of the statue to consider the good faith of law enforcement as a part of that discretion. Although such an approach is different than applying the Leon exception directly, it
achieves a highly similar result and thus serves the same ends
as Leon.

152 See, for example, Rice, 478 US at 713 ("[T]he language from the Senate Report
indicates a desire to incorporate only the search and seizure law that was in place at the
time of the passage of Title III."). See also Orozco, 630 F Supp at 1522, n 9 (recognizing
that Leon was unknown to Congress in 1968, but concluding, contradictorily, that "Congress did not intend to bind the §2515 remedy to whatever the state of search and seizure
law is at the time of the interception").
153 By its own admission, Congress was concerned with the prevention of crime and
restricting the amount of evidence available with which to convict does little to combat
crime. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
154 S Rep No 90-1097 at 68 (cited in note 29).
155 And in the case of later-arising and stricter constitutional principles, Congress
would have been powerless to effect that result anyway. If the Constitution were later
found to be more protective of privacy than previously understood, this narrower regime
would trump Title III by its very nature as a constitutional principle.
156 See 18 USC §2518(10)(a) ("If the motion [to suppress] is granted.) (emphasis
added).
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Courts could consider good faith as an element of the
Giordano and Chavez rule that suppression obtains only when
the violation is of a requirement meant to compel compliance
with the statute. If a statutory requirement is intended to compel
compliance by law enforcement and has actually done so, then
suppression serves no further purpose. This approach to
Giordano and Chavez mirrors Leon's focus on deterrence. Furthermore, since a list of requirements that trigger Giordano and
Chavez has never been espoused by the Supreme Court, such an
approach-one that considers the good faith of law enforcement
as an element of the Giordano and Chavez rubric-is not ruled
out by current case law.
Alternatively, courts deciding Title III motions to suppress
could attempt to shoehorn considerations of good faith into one of
the more ambiguous phrases of Title III. For example, good faith
on the part of law enforcement could play directly into the court's
consideration of whether, under § 2518(10)(a)(i), the communication was "unlawfully intercepted." Because Title III requires a
mens rea of intentionality before an interception is unlawful,15 7
whether an officer acted with good faith seems to be a relevant
factor in the unlawfulness of an interception. In fact, an officer's
subjective and objective approach to a Title III wiretap might be
the only way to resolve the conflicting language in
§ 2518(10)(a)(i): "Any aggrieved person ... may move to suppress
... any wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this
chapter ... on the grounds that (i) the communication was unlaw15 8
fully intercepted."
In a similar approach to § 2518(10)(a), courts
could interpret "unlawfully intercepted" to mean that the wiretap authorization order was validly obtained, even if the authorization order was not itself valid. 159 Under that approach, whether law enforcement acted with good faith in obtaining the war-

157 See 18 USC § 2511(a).
158 18 USC § 2518(10)(a) (emphasis added). That an interception may be conducted
pursuant to Title III but also unlawfully suggests that something factors into the lawfulness of the interception that is not enumerated in the statute. This could be a reference to
constitutional principles-which, after Leon, include good faith-or it could be an indication that judicial officers should use discretion in granting motions to suppress, which
discretion could include considerations of good faith.
159 This approach might be unavailable as to the other two §2518(10)(a) grounds to
suppress (authorization order was insufficient on its face or interception was not made in
conformity with the authorization order). But the "validly obtained order" versus "valid
order" distinction is viable on an independent basis, as it was actually suggested by Congress. See United States v Donovan, 429 US 413, 432, n 22 (1977), citing S 917, 90th
Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 8, 1967), in 114 Cong Rec 14718 (May 23, 1968) ("So long as a court
order is validly obtained, evidence obtained under the order should be admissible.").
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rant could be a factor in deciding whether the warrant was validly obtained. Thus, as either an element of judicial discretion or as
way to give meaning to some of the indefinite phrases in Title IlI,
courts could indirectly consider good faith when deciding motions
to suppress.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the investigation and prosecution of public corruption,
wiretapping and other electronic surveillance can be a significant
source of evidence. Gathered pursuant to a Title III authorization order, such evidence is admissible in later court proceedings.
But, perhaps to the chagrin of those concerned with combating
corruption, some courts have decided to exclude wiretap evidence
when law enforcement officers or authorizing judges make minor
and inconsequential errors during the authorization process.
Other courts, however, have readily admitted such evidence under the good faith exception espoused in United States v Leon.
Which of these approaches is proper?
Because the types of errors that qualify for the good faith exception are hard to engineer artificially, there is little risk that
law enforcement officers or judges might themselves become corrupt through the operation of the good faith exception. Because
of this lack of moral hazard, the fight against corruption might
be best served by universal adoption of the good faith exception.
This Comment has argued that, as a legal matter, the Leon good
faith exception can be applied to Title III wiretaps without any
further legislative action. That the pro-Leon result can obtain in
the current state of the world is an important fact in the fight
against corruption, as it means that courts and prosecutors do
not have to be impeded by congressional inaction.
The two main cases rejecting Leon, Orozco and Rice, are subject to criticism. But there are also affirmative reasons why the
good faith exception should apply directly to all wiretaps that
violate the Constitution-to preserve the separation of powers
inherent in, and particularly important to, issues of a constitutional magnitude; and to wiretaps of wire and oral communications that violate Title III but not the Constitution-to give
meaning to § 2518(10)(c) and because Title III itself calls for a
consideration of the state of mind of an unlawful interceptor.
This leaves only wiretaps of electronic communications intercepted in violation of Title III, but not in violation of the Constitution, unprotected by the good faith exception. Since evidence
obtained through such wiretaps is not suppressed by Title III or
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the Constitution, the good faith exception is unnecessary. Finally, for all wiretaps subject to statutory suppression, the good
faith of a law enforcement officer can indirectly factor into a
court's decision to suppress, either through the exercise of judicial discretion that is granted in § 2518(10)(a) or through importation of good faith into ambiguous statutory phrases like "unlawfully intercepted" in § 2518(10)(a)(i).

